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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper shows how organizational waste and processes of bricolage have an 
important role in the functioning of public organizations, and how this is essential to 
innovation, organisational resilience and survival. This paper largely builds on the work of 
organisation theorist Karl E. Weick and his work on bricolage and improvisation more 
specifically. The paper is conceptual in nature, and outlines the characteristics of the concept 
of bricolage, and the organisational requirements for bricolage to emerge and flourish. It 
shows how organisations that are over-proceduralised or over-organised leave little space for 
the emergence of solutions and actions. This has negative consequences for organisational 
learning and for innovation, and, ultimately, for organizations’ capability to deal with crises. 
Organisational memory, a certain degree of discretion, waste and redundancy are crucial for 
organisations’ long-term survival.  
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Introduction 
Public organizations rely to a great extent on standard operating procedures to guide 
their actions in daily operations and interventions. In this article we use the literature on 
organisational improvisation and bricolage to show how excess organisation in organisations 
may hinder their capability to cope with emerging trends and sudden unexpected events such 
as crises. This paper largely builds on the work of organisation theorist Karl E. Weick and his 
work on bricolage and improvisation more specifically. It is argued that a certain degree of 
redundancy and waste is required to safeguard organisations’ resilience and survival. By 
allowing employees to become bricoleurs, innovative solutions may emerge in situations 
where standard operating procedures are not available. This requires organisations to allow a 
certain degree of discretion based on employees’ professional skills who can tap into their 
own experience and a reservoir of organisational memory. The article outlines the 
characteristics of the concept of bricolage, and the organisational requirements for bricolage 
to emerge and flourish. 
 
This paper has four main parts. First, we show how traditional organisation studies 
have largely ignored the concept of improvisation and emergence. We highlight that they 
have dealt with emergence in an indirect way by devoting considerable attention to processes 
of formalisation in organisations and the related positive and negative effects of such 
formalisation. After introducing this literature, we show how improvisation and bricolage may 
make organisations more resilient. Finally, we discuss how a certain degree of waste in the 
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organisation of public organisations contributes to their ability to cope with crises and 
unexpected events. 
 
 
Restricting Emergence: Curtailing Deviance in Formal Organisations 
 
Criticism of traditional bureaucratic organisation is not new, and the dangers of 
attributing too much value to formal organisation have been highlighted before 
(Thompson,1965; Adler and Borys, 1996). Thompson’s classic critique of traditional 
bureaucracy is very relevant here: ‘the bureaucratic form of organization is characterised by 
high productive efficiency but low innovative capacity' (Thompson, 1965). It demonstrates 
the tension between the rigid, rule-based logic of bureaucracies, and the more messy reality of 
innovation (Bowden, 1979). Following rules and procedures is a key characteristic of the 
classic Weberian approach to bureaucracies. Not following the rule is deviant behaviour. 
Classic organisation theory has likewise treated deviance from organisational rules as 
exceptional and undesirable. At the same time the literature is full of examples where rule-
breaking is associated with problem-solving, innovation, and success (Lipsky, 1980; Riccucci, 
2005;O'Leary, 2005). Behaviours and actions out-of-the-normal may be more common to 
organisations – even highly formalised ones – than generally assumed. In addition, such 
behaviours may fulfil important functions in organisational evolution and survival. 
 
Organisation theory combines paradoxical elements: you should have formal 
organisation, and you should have flexibility (see also Talbot, 2005). These are two 
contradicting administrative doctrines (Hood and Jackson, 1991), which makes the effects of 
formalisation on organisations far from clear. Adler and Borys distinguished between two 
types of formalisation: enabling and coercive (Adler and Borys, 1996). In organisation 
studies, they argue, two different views on formalisation, or bureaucracy, exist. One posits 
that bureaucracy stifles creativity, and demotivates workers. Yet, according to the positive 
view, formalisation is positive because if provides guidance and reduces role stress (Adler and 
Borys, 1996: 61). 
 
Selznick’s classic observation in 1957 that organisation analysis mainly deals with 
analysis of routine processes (Selznick, 1957: 31) may well still hold. In some subdomains of 
organisation theory non-routine processes have recently started to receive more attention, and 
concepts such as bricolage, improvisation have slowly become part of the canon (Weick, 
2001; Kamoche,Pina e Cunha and Vieira da Cunha,2002). In public administration theory, 
complexity is a growing niche (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997; Koppenjan and Klijn, 
2004; Klijn, 2008). Bureaucracies’ ways of coping with firm structures yet fuzzy mandates 
are well documented (Lerner and Wanat, 1983), and the importance of having routine 
processes as a way of coping with non-routine events has likewise received considerable 
attention. 
 
 
The New Proceduralism in Public Sector Organisations and Implications 
for Emergence 
 
Despite the observation that public sector organisations operate in a fast-changing 
environment, many public sectors have resorted to quite traditional organisational reform 
recipes. These tend to give considerable attention to streamlining and strengthening 
organisational procedures, and have relied extensively on processes of standardisation, 
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formalisation, normalisation, and systemisation. While intended to counter dysfunctions of 
traditional bureaucracies, some reforms have resulted in new types of proceduralism, thereby 
in effect re-affirming and strengthening the traditional bureaucratic formalism.  
 
In J. Q. Wilson’s now classic distinction between different types of government 
agencies, production-type agencies are just one possible type. Typical for production agencies 
is that activities, outputs and outcomes are relatively easy to define (Wilson, 1989: 158-171). 
This is only the case for a very limited number of government organisations. The activities in 
these production-type agencies can be organised using Fordist principles, based on clear 
procedures. Because activities and outcomes, and the relation between both, are more difficult 
to define or measure, and because these concepts are at the same time unstable and changing, 
such a Fordist approach may be less appropriate for what Wilson calls procedural, craft or 
coping organisations. Yet, he sees a tendency in government reforms to treat all agencies as 
production-type agencies, and to apply reform mechanisms appropriate for these agencies, 
such as tight procedures, detailed records etc. to all government organisations (Wilson, 1989: 
170). Similarly, New Public Management reforms have tended to be reduced to a neo-taylorist 
agenda (Pollitt, 1990), and in policy-making Stone observed a growing belief in the 
rationality project, or a move towards making policy using ‘rational, analytical, and scientific 
methods’ (Stone, 2002). Seddon likens reforms in the UK public sector to the establishment 
of ‘public service factories’ (Seddon, 2008: 147). 
 
In his books on tides of reform in the US Federal government, Light speaks about a 
new proceduralism in the 1980s and early 1990s to describe a situation where management 
has become more procedural, and where procedural fixes are the preferred method to make 
government work (Light, 1997: 115-123). Despite all the attention for fancy new concepts 
such as deregulation, decentralisation, internal competition, partnerships etc., traditional 
bureaucracy has proved to be a very durable and persistent organisational principle 
(Schofield, 2001). Entrepreneurialism in NPM appears to be something that mainly applies to 
managers, not to front-line workers, who are increasingly locked into a series of systems and 
procedures. 
 
Despite high-minded rhetoric, there lies a strong common element below many 
managerial innovations and the mainstream management theory. Rational managers, formal 
strategy, and rational and planned use of resources are all part of management consultant’s 
toolbox (Pina e Cunha, 2005). Half a century ago, Philip Selznick already complained about 
the ‘overemphasis on neat organization’ in mechanical metaphors of organisations (Selznick, 
1957: 3). Management models and aids such as Total Quality Management, Business Process 
Reengineering, lean thinking, strategic management and performance measurement place 
considerable emphasis on procedures and formalism, and have difficulties dealing with the 
creative results of divergence from procedures, and accounting for organisational change. As 
such, they are helpful in stable environments. Formalised bureaucratic structures are geared 
towards productivity and control, not towards creativity and innovation, and even less towards 
resilience(Thompson, 1965). This makes organisations that appear to function very efficiently 
in their day-to-day operations very vulnerable to changes in their environment.  
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The Virtues of Standard Operating Procedures 
 
Formalising organisations has tremendous advantages for the performance and 
predictability of organisations and their outputs. By incorporating organisational activities 
into procedures, by making all individual acts in the organisation explicit, and by formalising 
informal activities, instrumental improvement becomes possible. The study of public 
administration has often focused on the dysfunctions of bureaucracy and the bureaucrat 
personality has been described as dull, grey, rule following and risk avoiding (Merton, 1940). 
Yet formalisation, and thus curtailing emergence, has important virtues, both for operational 
efficiency, cost, and employee well-being. 
 
Formalisation provides organisations with a certain degree of stability. Even when 
organisations function in environments with varying degrees of uncertainty, the stability and 
predictability offered by formalisation aids systems in their survival (Silberman, 1993). In 
high-uncertainty environments organisations need specialised systems to increase their 
knowledge. Formalised routines then become extremely practical. Furthermore, lower levels 
of discretion due to extensive rule systems may be a solution to counter common mistakes 
(Ayres, 2007: 85) and may thus increase predictability. Formalism makes an organisation and 
its environment stable, but institutionalisation also means losing flexibility (Selznick, 1957: 
7). 
 
A further related advantage of highly formalised and routinised systems is that they 
have clear and transparent lines of accountability (Kassel, 2008). Having strong, visible and 
stable formal structures gives organisations an appearance of competence. Formal structures 
provide legitimacy, and signal that an organisation is acting in an appropriate manner (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1991: 50). 
 
Formalisation of organisations also has a number of positive effects on employees. It 
may protect them against arbitrary decisions, rewards and punishments. Rules and norms act 
as neutral authority and take randomness and abuse out of the line manager. In this way, 
formalisation may strengthen employees’ feelings of justice, fairness, equity (Aldrich, 1999: 
137). Formalism and bureaucracy regulate the behaviour of employees ‘by a complex and all-
encompassing set of rules’ (Wilson, 1989: 114). This reduces role ambiguity, creates stability, 
and shows each and every employee what his or her role in and contribution to the 
organisation is, thereby potentially strengthening organisational identification. Yet, by 
providing clear guidance, role definitions also show employees what is the bare minimum that 
needs to be done (Merton, 1940). Excessive formalisation has important dysfunctions as we 
will show in the next section. 
 
 
The Formalistic Straightjacket and Implications for Emergence and 
Resilience 
 
The virtues of formalisation are well-known, and therefore they do not generally 
become the topic of research or social commentary. Instead, much research has focused on the 
dysfunctions of organisational formalisation. Dysfunctions of formalisation include situations 
where structures and norms become a formalistic straightjacket and thereby hinder the 
organisation in effectively performing its functions. Formalisation also appears to have an 
effect on the skills and learning behaviours of organisations’ employees, and may lead to 
organisational fragmentation. Individual irresponsibility and a reduction of systems to its 
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component factors may then be the result. More importantly, formalisation, and especially 
excessive formalisation, may affect the organisation’s capacity to act in changing 
environments, and may have negative effects on innovative capacity and organisational 
memory. In this paper, we use the concept overformalisation to refer to situations where 
organisations have formalised extensively, and where there is only limited discretion.  
 
The argument in this paper is not that formalisation is bad for organisations. But 
organisations need to be aware of the dysfunctions of formalisation, especially when 
embarking on a process of reformalising their activities or strengthening their procedures by 
using popular managerial aids. There is a fine line between functional and dysfunctional 
procedures. When public officials start working to the rule, this often results in organisational 
gridlock (Scott, 1998: 310). Research on regulation identifies compliance junkies, who 
comply with rules for the sake of it. This is for instance evident in Bardach and Kagan’s book 
Going by the book(Bardach and Kagan, 2002) in which they discuss the concept of regulatory 
unreasonableness, whereby strict compliance to rules is the ultimate guide for behaviour and 
leads to dysfunctional regulation.Bureaucracies are motivated by stabilising the organisation’s 
operating system (Mintzberg, 1978: 941), and by defining away environmental pressure. This 
may result in what Holling calls a rigidity trap, in which systems become too tightly aligned 
and controlled that they cannot adapt to external changes, resulting in a loss of innovative 
capacity (Holling, 2001: 400). 
 
Deprofessionalisation, Deskilling and Job Morale 
 
Formalisation in organisations has been found to lead to alienation and loss of 
autonomy, especially in organisational contexts with many professionals (Podsakoff, 
Williams and Todor, 1986). By formalising and standardising all tasks within an organisation, 
the level of skill required to perform these tasks decreases and employees performing similar 
tasks are interchangeable. Some have labelled this phenomenon as dumbing down public 
services, because it is based on employing cheap people working on scripts (Seddon, 2008: 
73). This critique is very much in line with old critiques on Taylorism, which focused on the 
detachment of the worker’s skills from the task at hand, the separation of conception and 
execution, and the close managerial control of the work. 
 
Formalisation, as a result, may lead to workers who are highly skilled in one specific 
capacity, but with little cross-departmental learning. Learning requires employees who 
participate, who feel empowered, and who have a certain level of discretion to acquire and use 
new knowledge (Fiol and Lyles, 1985).Holling uses the concept of a poverty trap in systems, 
where adaptive capacities in systems have been eradicated so that change is no longer 
possible (Holling, 2001: 400). This may indeed be the case, but one has to appreciate that 
such rigidity and extreme specialisation is exactly why formalised systems have been so 
successful. 
 
Related recent concerns have focused on the application of models such as lean and 
mean production and the effect they may have on employee morale and commitment (Knights 
and McCabe, 2003: 121). Likewise, Radnor and Boaden have emphasised lean thinking’s 
effects on workforce stress and a loss of autonomy (Radnor and Boaden, 2004). As the 
management thinker Chris Argyris argued, formal organisation and ‘the needs of a mature 
personality’ may be incongruent because of the requirements of formal organisation leading 
to employees with minimal control over their environment, who are expected to be passive, 
subordinate, dependent and who are expected to adapt a short time horizon, and only need to 
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use shallow abilities (Argyris, 1965: 66). A characteristic of public organizations is that they 
have ramifications that go well beyond the immediate organisation and its processes (Smith, 
1995: 285). Formalisation reducesthe scope of individual jobs and workers. In the literature 
on organisational citizenship, we find that a willingness to exceed one’s formal job 
requirements is a key element of such organisational citizenship (Organ and Greene, 1981; 
Organ, 1990; Aldrich, 1999: 131). When jobs are defined narrowly, employees may be less 
likely to do things that are not part of the formal requirements and to perform extra-role 
behaviour (Morrison, 1994). The philosopher MacIntyre expands this argument and argues 
that irresponsibility may be strengthened and that moral agency risks to disappear when 
someone does not look beyond the own clearly demarcated role (MacIntyre, 1999). But again, 
the evidence is not conclusive. Research on organisational formalisation has also found that it 
sometimes leads to higher rather than lower organisational commitment (Podsakoff, Williams 
and Todor, 1986; Michaels et al., 1988). 
 
System Dependency, Supervision and Initiative 
 
Employee skills matter for management and supervision requirements. The 
observations in the preceding sections are not unlike Veblen’s old observation of trained 
incapacity (Veblen, 1914). Very formal and specialised job descriptions and an unwillingness 
to act beyond one’s own clearly demarcated formal role may create irresponsibility for wider 
organisational processes and outcomes. Highly formalised organisations consist of a series of 
segregated small units, and the boundaries between units pinpoint responsibility. The same 
boundaries also encourage irresponsibility when boundaries are crossed (Thompson, 1965: 8-
9). ‘I’ll have to check with my manager’ then becomes a common credo. 
 
The result of such changes is that coordination moves up higher into the hierarchy, 
because lower levels have become too highly specialised. High specialisation of employees 
increases the need for supervision and coordination. Standardisation appears to coincide with 
an increased supervision over the frontline (Ackroyd, Kirkpatrick and Walker, 2007). 
According to Turok and Edge (1999), there has indeed been an increase in managerial jobs, 
yet they are not clear about the reasons for this increase. Mason found that the number of 
supervisors after the introduction of lean production remained stable and did not decline as 
lean thinking would have prescribed. But he did not find an increase in the number of 
supervisors, as some of the arguments discussed in this section would have suggested (Mason, 
2000). 
 
Research by De Witte and Steijnshowed that while many jobs have become more 
complex jobs, they have not come with more autonomy for employees (De Witte and Steijn, 
2000). Middle managers are also complaining about the ever smaller amount of discretion 
they have in decision making, their limited management autonomy, and the fear to do things 
beyond their remit, resulting in decreasing morale (Thomas and Dunkerley, 1999). Kelman 
used the concept fear of discretion in research on government procurement, to refer to 
structural impediments that stop public officials from exercising discretion (Kelman, 1990). 
 
This limited discretion in an overformalised environment is also evident from research 
on the impact of IT systems on workers’ discretion. Such systems effectively function as a 
system of control (Knights and McCabe, 2003: 70). Adler and Borys talk about a deskilling 
logic(1996: 74), where machines are designed to minimise reliance on employees’ skills and 
discretion. Only the supervisor can authorise deviation from the procedure (Adler and Borys, 
1996: 74), thereby effectively limiting learning opportunities for individual workers. 
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Macdonald (2002) talks about technological determinism. In research in Dutch social security 
offices, Scheepers(1992) found that street level bureaucrats are more inclined to approach the 
problem from the organisation’s viewpoint rather than from the clients’: ‘Case-workers using 
a computer during contacts indicate that in case of disagreements with clients they are much 
less inclined to go into the problem, talk it over and search for a solution. Instead, these case-
workers are more inclined to hush the problem, to avoid the problem, or to evade the problem 
by letting someone else with more authority deal with it’ (Scheepers, 1992: 355). Formalism 
prescribes a best way, where problems only exist when they are recognised by the system. 
Other problems bring the system in disarray, and the operator is not allowed to solve them. 
Such solutions disrupt the system or violate lines of authority. The operator may also no 
longer be able to solve problems because of deskilling and overspecialisation. Despite these 
studies, there is no scientific agreement on whether technology and formalisation lead to de- 
or revaluation of skills in the organisation (Adler and Borys, 1996: 67). But it is evident that 
formalised IT systems do not exactly facilitate emergence in organisations (Bovens and 
Zouridis, 2002). 
 
The Elimination of Creative Discretion 
 
Early organisation theory was based on a myth of formal organisation and disregarded 
(informal) organisational reality (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). In a fully rational organisation 
there is no place for discretion, because the rule is seen as entirely functional. Administrative 
discretion has since the 1960s become one of the key concepts in public administration (Blau, 
1963; Lipsky, 1980; Hill and Hupe, 2002). Gradually, the idea that a willingness to bend 
rules, nonconformity and risk taking were essential for organisations to function and survive 
gained ground (DeHart-Davis, 2007). Rule bending can be both beneficial and detrimental to 
the organisation, but this often is a normative judgment (DeHart-Davis, 2007). In the latter 
case, concepts such a rule breaking, shirking, and sabotage are often used (O'Leary, 2005). 
Traditional responses to observed discretion were to treat it as undesirable, dysfunctional, and 
even illegal. Generally, there is always some discretion built into systems (routine discretion), 
whereby selection between alternatives has to be made. Creative discretion goes somewhat 
further (and is often required in customised services), and deviant discretion involves moving 
beyond the framework (Kelley, 1993). Higher formalisation in an organisation reduces 
deviant discretion (Kelley, Longfellow and Malehorn, 1996: 149-150), but it may also reduce 
other types of discretion. 
 
Innovation often emerges from discretionary practices rather than from planning. 
Discretion is necessary: ‘The amount of discretion available to managers is a strong factor in 
determining whether improvisation will be used. If one assumes that greater freedom invites 
increased improvisation, those most likely to improvise in the public sector are elected 
officials and upper-level managers. At a collective level, agencies most likely to improvise are 
those that exist in a chaotic environment, or in a cultural climate that supports improvisation.’ 
(FitzPatrick, 2002: 648). 
 
In highly formalised organisations, such as the production-type agencies as described 
by Wilson (1989), innovation is unlikely to emerge from within the production process. 
Bureaucratic structures are geared towards productivity and control, not towards creativity 
and innovation (Thompson, 1965). Innovation needs ‘uncommitted money, time, skills and 
good will’ (Thompson, 1965: 10). Innovation and change in organisations can be due to 
‘mistakes, misunderstandings, surprises, and idle curiosity’ (Aldrich, 1999: 22). It needs an 
untidy structure, not the overspecification of formalised organisations (Thompson, 1965: 3): 
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‘In the innovative organization, departmentalization must be arranged so as to keep 
parochialism to a minimum. Some overlapping and duplication, some vagueness about 
jurisdictions, make a good deal of communication necessary. People have to define and 
redefine their responsibilities continually, case after case’ (Thompson, 1965: 15). Innovation, 
in other words, requires serendipity and spontaneity (Kamoche, Pina e Cunha and Vieira da 
Cunha, 2002: 7). A drive for conformity is therefore bad for innovation in public 
organizations(Bowden, 1979). Retention of organisation (i.e. keeping what is) happens 
through limiting discretion; change through nurturing discretion and thus emergence (Aldrich, 
1999; 21-41).Excessive procedures make emergence no longer possible to achieve, because it 
is not allowed. Improvisation and trial and error look unplanned and inefficient, and are 
therefore often considered as bad (Pina e Cunha, Vieira da Cunha and Kamoche, 2002). 
Hesitant steps towards innovation may well be seen as divergence or inefficiency by those 
higher up in the organisation. 
 
Implications for Learning and Institutional Memory 
 
Excessive formalisation, we have mentioned earlier, may lead to a shrinking 
knowledge base in organisations. In the organisation, little exists beyond the procedure book 
and strategic plan. Employees act as repositories of non-formalised or non-codified 
knowledge (Aldrich, 1999: 144), yet in overformalised organisations non-codified 
information has no place. Employees are not encouraged to think beyond their own particular 
role and function. This leaves a very fragmented knowledge base. Local knowledge is not 
taken into account, because it is seen as irrelevant in an organisation that has been entirely 
planned. Overformalised organisations are particularly bad at dealing with non-codified 
information, which means there is little space for information and knowledge to emerge. 
Without such information emergence, it is difficult for organisations to anticipate changes in 
their environment, putting them at risk. 
 
There are however also arguments going in the opposite direction. Pollitt talks about 
organisational forgetting, and explores the argument that post-bureaucratic organisations do 
not learn, but forget, and that traditional bureaucracies tend to have better organisational 
memories (Pollitt, 2009). Indeed, formalised organisations are more likely to have well-
defined storage locations for information (routines, archives, records, long-term employees 
etc.), this unlike less-permanent and networked organisations. Modern organisations and 
systems may suffer from institutional amnesia or a disappearing organisational memory. 
(Pollitt, 2000). This phenomenon may also be related to the process of deskilling mentioned 
earlier, leading to the disappearance of employees with in-depth, broad, specialised and 
longterm memories, in favour of short-term system operators. We will further explore these 
assertions in a later section. This has an effect on organisations’ anticipative capacity, as we 
will see later. 
 
 
The Role of Organisational Improvisation and Bricolage for Resilient 
Organisations 
 
Defining Bricolage 
 
Bricolage, a concept borrowed from the anthropologist Claude Levi Strauss, became 
familiar to organisation scholars through the work of Karl Weick(see e.g. Weick, 1993). 
Bricolage refers to a nonlinear, nonplanned, nondirect way of thinking. Bricolage ‘can be 
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defined as the invention of resources from the available materials to solve unanticipated 
problems’ (Pina e Cunha, 2005: 6). The bricoleur, or he who bricolates, ‘in contrast to the 
scientist or engineer, acquires and assembles tools and materials as he or she goes, keeping 
them until they might be used. Each is shaped in part by its previous application but remains 
inevitably underdetermined, imperfectly understood, open to manipulation for whatever 
purpose is at hand’ (Freeman, 2007: 486). Bricolage can thus not be captured in rules or 
procedures. Bricolage and improvisation are often used interchangeably in organisation theory 
(Pina e Cunha, Vieira da Cunha and Kamoche, 1999). Pina e Cunha and others define 
organisational improvisation as ‘the conception of action as it unfolds, by an organization 
and/or its members, drawing on available material, cognitive, affective and social resources.’ 
(Pina e Cunha,Vieira da Cunha and Kamoche, 1999: 302). Organisational improvisation 
diverges from more traditional models of organisation because it is based on a convergence of 
conception and execution (Moorman and Miner, 1998). Unlike a rational planner, bricoleurs 
go ahead using available material, rather than waiting for optimal conditions.  
 
Early researchers on organisational improvisation and bricolage often relied on 
metaphors, such as the improvisation of a jazz musician, to describe organisational realities 
(Bougon, Weick and Binkhorst, 1977; Bastien and Hostager, 2002). Later scholars attempted 
to define improvisation and its characteristics, and started to focus on businesses (Pina e 
Cunha, Vieira da Cunha and Kamoche, 1999). Bricolage is also used in studies on product 
design, and especially in the literature on innovations (Andersen, 2008), where the focus is on 
the bottom-up dynamics rather than on the planned nature of innovations. Coercive 
approaches to procedure design tended to see ‘any deviation from standard procedure’ as 
suspect (Adler and Borys, 1996: 71). Improvisation, therefore, is in this logic seen as 
undesirable. Organisation theory has in fact long recognised improvisation, but it ‘was seen as 
an organisation dysfunction’ (Leybourne, 2007: 231). Adler and Borys give the example of 
companies where employees are prevented from repairing something themselves, because 
access to the inner core or control panel of the machine would also allow them to tamper with 
other settings. Avoiding this tampering is seen as more necessary than bricolated repairs. 
‘Improvisations to support repetitive work need to be hidden’ (Vieira da Cunha, Pina e Cunha 
and Chia, 2007: 16) - they challenge managerial control. Bricolage, on the contrary, allows 
for a bottom-up employment of skills in the organisation (Andersen, 2008). As such, 
‘bricolage is not a deviation from “proper” management but a necessary practice for our 
organizations’ (Pina e Cunha, 2005: 6). Recent literature increasingly describes improvisation 
as an essential skills for managers rather than treating it as something in contradiction with 
managerial control (Leybourne, 2007). 
 
Bricolage and Improvisation as Situated Action – The Role of Organisational 
Memory 
 
Bricoleurs do not just do something. Organisational improvisation is not totally 
random behaviour. Bricoleurshave a great deal of practical experience, and fall back on a 
series of learned routines. Improvisation does not come out of the blue but requires informal 
knowledge networks (Augier and Vendelo, 1999) and tacit knowledge is essential. Bricoleurs 
use their memory, and have considerable local knowledge, much of which is not recognised in 
the organisation’s formal knowledge repositories. There are certain general rules, and much 
rehearsal is necessary to enable rapid cognition and complex decision-making (Gladwell, 
2005: 114). This makes bricolage situated action. 
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Yet, the literature is divided on whether organisational memory hinders improvisation 
because one returns to known patterns and structures, or stimulates it because one has more 
learned elements that can be recombined (Pina e Cunha, Vieira da Cunha and Kamoche, 
2002: 117-8). Returning to the jazz metaphor used in the preceding section, the question thus 
is whether the jazz player who has more tunes to choose from will revert to an old tune, or 
recombine tunes to a new one? Historical information may thus aid innovation through 
bricolage (Andersen, 2008), yet memorymay also hinder innovation, because it tends to rely 
on things that have been. Experience thus plays a role in both successful and unsuccessful 
improvisation (Miner, Bassoff and Moorman, 2001). Improvisation and bricolage differ from 
creativity in that improvisation and bricolage are not always novel (Pina e Cunha,Vieira da 
Cunha and Kamoche, 1999). It may just be recombination of old acts, or traditional behaviour 
that is not normally displayed in a certain context. At the core of the concept of bricolage is a 
recomposition of older elements. Entirely new things, fancy things as Weick calls them, are 
based on a recombination of existing elements and thus require memory (Weick, 2005: 426). 
Bricoleurs may use and unearth techniques that seemed obsolete or even unorthodox, and so 
become innovative. 
 
Organisational and individual memory and experience come under pressure in highly 
formalised environments, as already mentioned. Bricolage requires lots of practice and prior 
experience (Weick, 2001: 286-9). Therefore, ‘Bricolage is more likely to be practiced by 
experienced rather than by inexperienced people’ (Pina e Cunha, 2005: 16). Weick suggested 
that a too extensive formal training may have a negative effect on problem-solving capacity 
(Weick, 2001: 295), because this training only prepares one to function in a heavily 
standardised, proceduralised and predetermined environment and not in a new and chaotic 
ones (Weick, 2001: 111). Such overlearned behaviours may then impede successful action in 
changing, unpredictable situations (Weick, 1985). Especially in times of crisis, organisational 
memory becomes important. Organisational memory is partly embodied in standard operating 
procedures, systems and artefacts (Walsh and Rivera Ungson, 1991). Organisational memory 
is also dependent on and embodied in individual memory. 
 
Encouraging and Controlling Bricolage 
 
Enabling bricolage and improvisation to stimulate innovation and problem-solving, 
while at the same time limiting it to safeguard routine performance and compliance is a key 
challenge. Just as absence of routines may lead to inefficient organisation, routine itself may 
become stifling, and even dangerous. Weickgives the example of fire-fighters who are most 
likely to get killed or injured in their 10
th
 year on the job, because they then become less open 
to new information. Bricolage is based on experience rather than on the organisation’s 
organising theory or theoretical purism (Bardach and Kagan, 2002: 84-5). This may at times 
become problematic in a public organisation, which is generally based on such relatively 
purist organising principles, such as the rule of law, equity, and clear definitions of 
boundaries. Bricoleurs typically think and act beyond their function and work across existing 
boundaries. They span boundaries and take initiative. For bricolage to work, some degree of 
social capital and trust is required (Campbell, 1997), something which does not always 
flourish in a control- and compliance-driven environment. 
 
Weick encourages organisational complication rather than simplification, and a kind 
of purposeful playfulness in organisations(Weick, 1979). Simplification, routines, and 
operating manuals can be harmful to organisations because they make the emergence of new 
ideas or on-the-spot responses difficult if not impossible. Bricolage needs local learning, and 
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emerges not from plans but from local needs. It requires tolerance and encouraging of local 
tinkering at the operational level, rather than planned change. Whereas Weberian approaches 
to organisation regard deviation from rules as a mistake, systems approaches view deviations 
as ‘part of the social order of an organization’. They ‘contribute to the maintenance and 
preservation of the system.’ (Brans and Rossbach, 1997: 420). 
 
 
Bricolage and Improvisation 
 
Standard Operating Procedures and Coping with External Shocks 
 
One view on how emergence and resilience go together is that emergence makes 
systems vulnerable, because of an absence of formalisation. The argument goes that routines, 
formalisation and standards help an organisation to react to shocks. They thus help stabilising 
an organisation by reducing environmental uncertainties. Standard operating procedures allow 
the organisation to react fast and to survive external shocks. Improvising organisations or 
networks on the other hand may be quite vulnerable, because of a lack of standard operating 
procedures to fall back on. They need to find ways to formalise ad-hoc collaborations and to 
adapt to new environmental demands.  
 
At the same time, following standard operating procedures during unprecedented 
events or crises may also turn out to be disastrous (Aldrich, 1999: 334; Hood 2000; Gormley 
and Balla, 2004: 26-7). Overorganised systems are quite vulnerable to collapse. C. Northcote 
Parkinson, best known for his book Parkinson’s Law observed that ‘a perfection of planned 
layout is achieved only by institutions on the point of collapse’ (Parkinson, 1957: 60). In other 
words, resilient systems need to have a certain degree of messiness.  
 
The Role of Emergence in Strong and Resilient Organisations 
 
Weick and Sutcliffe, when writing about high-reliability organisations (HROs), such 
as air traffic control, observed that these organisations tended to avoid simplification. One of 
the reasons why HROs can cope with the unexpected, is that they are ‘reluctant to accept 
simplifications’ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001: 11). As a result, they remain aware of context. 
Their main concern is not to celebrate success, but to learn from failure. As a result, they are 
mainly concerned with the unexpected, not with the already known (Weick, 2005: 435). This 
stands in sharp contrast with highly formalised production-type organisations which tend to 
value success over the absence of failure, and therefore rely on a high degree of 
simplification. Systems open to emergence on the other hand are generally relative 
complicated. In a risky environment, where change is hard to anticipate, it makes sense to 
build a resilient organisation. 
 
Resilience and Emergence Require Organisational Redundancy and Waste 
 
Both emergence and resilience require a certain degree of redundancy and slack. 
Earlier we used Cyert and March’s concept organisational slack(1963: 36-8), which functions 
as a buffer to absorb external shocks. In classic economic thinking, such slack is seen as a 
redundancy that can be eliminated. A common recipe in organisational reform is to reduce 
waste (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990: 103). There often is talk about zero-redundancy, and 
non-fragmentation of public services as the way forward, and the lean and mean approach is 
at the basis of many reforms (Miranda and Lerner, 1995). Waste and redundancies are 
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generally seen as things the organisation can do without. There are however situations where 
organisations become too lean, or anorexic (Radnor and Boaden, 2004), or where 
organisations have gotten rid of elements that may prove to be very useful when 
circumstances change.  
 
Grinding an organisation down to subsistence levels restricts its repertoire of 
responses to crises and may make it incapable of performing (Landau, 1991: 12; Bozeman, 
1993: 276). According to Landau (1969: 349), redundancies have a latent function in 
organisations. In engineering, overengineering has long been a common practice, with many 
redundant structures to protect a system, building or machine against failure and collapse. A 
certain degree of overengineering reduces the risk of failure (Landau, 1969: 349). In public 
organisations, creating redundancy is often used to reduce political uncertainty, and to 
safeguard policy implementation (Ting, 2003). 
 
Redundancy generally has a negative connotation: something that is not needed, 
superfluous, useless (Landau, 1969: 346). Resilient organisations contain many redundant 
structures. As we have argued, organisations facilitating emergence also require redundancy. 
Bricolage only occurs when the organisation or system contains sufficient volumes of 
organisational memory and when a great deal of cross-organisational linkages exist. Bricolage 
means recombining tools and action repertoires, including some that had hitherto been seen as 
outdated and superfluous. It also means that excessive planning in organisations may make 
organisations more vulnerable, because planning often results in slimming down organisations 
to those elements that appear to have direct relevance (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001: 51). 
Seemingly irrelevant organisational units and knowledge may become highly relevant when 
the context changes, or when an organisation is faced with new challenges or external threats. 
To be able to survive crises, systems and organisations require redundancy, or the 
maintenance of back-up systems, and a greater use of materials than would normally be 
necessary (Hood, 1991: 14). 
 
The ability to deal with crises requires deep knowledge: ‘deep knowledge of the 
technology, the system, one’s co-workers, one’s self, and the raw materials’ (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2001: 15). Highly formalised systems codify knowledge and trim knowledge down 
to its bare necessities. To deal with crises, a system needs people in the organisation to be 
mindful to halt or contain the development of unexpected events (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001: 
3). To do so, people need to know the context and see the signals. This requires that the 
organisation facilitates imagination. Highly formalised organisations tend to put things into 
categories to make their world stable and certain, and thereby overlook unnamed experience. 
i.e. things that do not (yet) fit any category, that are unnamed, and thus not known (Weick, 
2005). 
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